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ELLEN HOCHSTEDLER STEURY, PH.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article presents the findings of a study designed to esti-
mate the proportion of individuals in a given criminal defendant
population who were also treated for psychiatric impairment. This
inquiry, based on data from Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, from the
period 1981-1985, is of interest for both practical and theoretical
reasons.' The focus of this Article, however, is the theoretical inter-
est in the intersection of the criminal and psychiatric populations; an
interest which is rooted in two traditions of thought: jurisprudence
and sociology.
* Professor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. I am grateful to Alice Klaybor and
Mary Pepke for access to and collection of data from the Milwaukee County Mental
Health Complex; to Robert Erdmann for access to the felony and misdemeanor case
files of the Milwaukee County Clerk of Courts; to Renee Younk, Deborah Lang, Mark
Seis, Suzanne Sobczak, and Anne Voegele for data collection; and to Frances Johannes
for assistance in data processing and management. This research was supported in part
by a grant from The Graduate School, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
1 Most obvious among the practical reasons is the need to provide adequate medical
services to those enmeshed in the criminal justice system. Jails and prisons are ex-
tremely stressful environments, where even relatively stable minds might begin to lose
balance. See, e.g.,JohnJ. Gibbs, Symptoms of Psychopathology AmongJail Prisoners: The Effects
of Exposure to Environment, 14 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR 288 (1987). Basic humanitarian
concerns suggest the importance of adequate mental health services in such settings. A
related concern is for the safe management of persons in custodial settings. Safe and
effective management of mentally disordered persons in penal settings requires ade-
quately trained custodial personnel, adequate medical and mental health services, and
appropriately designed and equipped facilities. The threat of civil liability compels at-
tention to the special needs of the mentally disordered in these settings.
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A. JURISPRUDENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE
This research is ofjurisprudential importance because its find-
ings have broad implications for understanding the link between
mental disorder and criminal behavior, and in turn, for the meaning
of criminal culpability. For centuries, 2 Anglo-American law has rec-
ognized the special defense of insanity.3 Although rarely applied,
4
the insanity defense has been of profound theoretical importance in
defining the limits of criminal responsibility, and its resulting com-
munity moral sanction. 5 In fact, many have argued that without the
insanity defense it would be difficult to understand what criminal
culpability really means.
6
In the history of the United States, the insanity test has been
variously formulated to recognize particular effects7 of mental ab-
2 The first recorded jury acquittal by reason of insanity occurred in 1505. NIGEL
WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 26 (1968). However, juries were not the first
to exculpate accused criminals based on a psychiatric condition. Kings had been grant-
ing pardons for murder on the basis of madness since the 1300's. AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION CRIMINALJUSTICE AND MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 324 (1989) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS].
3 Except where otherwise noted, this term refers to the plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity, or not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, and these terms are used
interchangeably here. See infra text accompanying notes 7-11, for a more detailed dis-
cussion of the variants of the insanity defense.
4 There is some evidence that the number of insanity pleadings has increased in the
past several decades. See Jonas Robitscher & Andrew K. Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity
Defense, 31 EMORY LJ. 9, 49-51 (1982). However, the rate of insanity pleadings still
hovers at a very low point, typically between .25%o and 2%o of all felony filings. Lisa A.
Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight
State Study, Table 1 (unpublished working paper, on file with Policy Research
Associates).
5 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401
(1958).
6 This venerable position holds that the abolition of the insanity defense would
change the meaning of guilt, and necessarily, the meaning of innocence. See, e.g., ABRA-
HAM GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 223-226 (1967); Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline
of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 273 (1968); HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMI-
NAL SANCTION 133 (1968). Essentially, the insanity defense is the validating exception to
the general rule of responsibility. This argument is similar to the point made by the
functionalist school of deviance: deviants are identified in order to instruct everyone by
inference as to what is acceptable behavior. SOCIAL DEVIANCE 9 (Ronald A. Farrell et al.
eds., 1975).
7 The nature of the causal relationship between mental abnormality and conduct is a
matter that remains largely unspecified and has been the cause of some revisions of the
insanity test formulation. The M'Naghten rule uses the term "from" to denote the con-
nection between the mental disorder and the cognitive impairment. See infra note 10.
The Model Penal Code [hereinafter MPC] specifies that the cognitive or volitional im-
pairment must be the "result" of the mental disease or defect. See infra note 11. In
1870, New Hampshire adopted an insanity defense test that stipulated the conduct must
be "the offspring and product of the mental disease." State v.Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 394
(1871). The New Hampshire rule, which is still in effect today, was not used by any
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normality8 on (a) the accused's ability to exercise free will or free-
dom of choice, the so-called "volitional" element, 9 (b) the accused's
other jurisdiction in the United States except the District of Columbia, which adopted
"product" language in 1954, in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
and later abandoned it in favor of the MPC rule. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
8 Mental abnormality is variously defined in statutes. The MPC construction,
"mental disease or defect" is common. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985). The
MPC language specifically adds that "[tihe terms 'mental disease or defect' do not in-
clude an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social con-
duct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (1985). The MPC construction of mental
abnormality is itself a variant on the M'Naghten terminology, "a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind." M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200 (1843). The new federal
insanity test, also a variant of the M'Naghten rule, refers to "severe mental disease or
defect." 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988). In modern statutory language, the required psychiatric
condition is not typically restricted to a "mental illness" or "mental disease." The legal
meaning of mental disease or defect needs to be at the same time both broader than and
narrower than the classifications used by mental health professionals for diagnostic and
therapeutic purposes. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 345.
9 The volitional element found in many insanity tests is as old as, or older than, the
cognitive element. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 67; Jodie English, The Light Between Twi-
light and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 1, 2-
3 (1988). Its most famous construction, the "irresistible impulse" test, was meant to
excuse those who had lost the power to choose between right and wrong, and thus avoid
doing the act in question. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 596 (1886). Encouraged by the
Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), many states added the
volitional element to the M'Naghten test. The resulting two-pronged test became the
standard in the United States until the 1962 MPC rule replaced it with a more modern
formulation of the volitional and cognitive elements. MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (1985)
(as adopted at the 1962 annual meeting of the American Law Institute). See infra note 11
for a complete discussion of the rule.
There has been evidence of growing dissatisfaction with the volitional element of
the insanity defense. In 1983, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
voted to drop the volitional prong from its recommended standards. ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 2, at 335-336. In 1984, the fifth circuit eliminated the volitional prong of its
insanity test in United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984), and the United
States Congress adopted an insanity test that did not include a volitional element. See 18
U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988). Much of the dissatisfaction seems to stem from a perception that
it is impossible to distinguish between "an irresistible impulse and an impulse not re-
sisted," Richard J. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A.J., Feb. 1983,
at 196, a position which the American Psychiatric Association substantially supported in
its 1982 statement on the insanity defense. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 341
n.49. Of course, psychiatrists and jurors today are no worse at distinguishing between
compulsion and indulgence than they were in previous times. English, supra, at 11.
It is worth noting, however, that where the volitional element has not been a part of
the insanity test, foreign and domestic jurisdictions have developed alternative means of
recognizing the diminished or partial responsibility of the volitionally impaired accused.
The United Kingdom, although retaining the traditional M'Naghten rule, allows a de-
fense of diminished responsibility based on volitional impairment (available since 1957)
and allows a defense of non-insane automatism (available since 1991). P.J. Sutherland &
C.A. Gearty, Insanity and the European Court of Human Rights, 1992 CRIM. L. REV. 418; Alec
Samuels, Mental Condition as a Defense in Criminal Law: A Lawyer Addresses Medical Men, 28
MED. Sci. & L. 21 (1988). Scotland's diminished capacity defense dates from the late
1600's, and persists today. Christopher M. Green et al., Criminal Responsibility and Mental
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ability to comprehend meaningfully the wrongfulness of the act, the
so-called "cognitive" element,' 0 or (c) both the accused's volitional
and cognitive abilities."' The notion of free will or freedom of
choice is perhaps the most critical justifying premise of our criminal
laws and punishments. The volitional element of the insanity test
relates directly to the "free choice" premise by recognizing that a
particular individual, at a particular point in time, may not possess
Disorder in Britain and North America: A Comparative Study, 31 MED. SCI. & L. 45, 48 (1991).
California is notable for developing several variations on the theme of diminished capac-
ity during the time its insanity defense recognized only cognitive impairment. See, e.g.,
People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492 (1950); People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959 (1964); People v.
Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (1966); People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 1318 (1978). California adopted
the MPC rule in 1978, but rejected it in 1982, when the legislature enacted laws permit-
ting psychiatric evidence to be introduced to address the element of mens rea only, and
specifically prohibiting defenses of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, or ir-
resistible impulses. Harlow M. Huckabee, Avoiding the Insanity Defense StraightJacket: The
Mens Rea Route, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1987). Despite the statutory proscriptions, the fact
that California allows psychiatric evidence to bear on mens rea culpability suggests that
it may soon allow diminished capacity defenses to an entire charged offense. Id.
10 The cognitive element of the insanity defense is reflected in the famous M'Naghten
rule, established in 1843:
[I]t must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 210. The M'Naghten rule soon became the standard in
the English speaking world, and prevailed in most jurisdictions in the United States until
modified by the addition of the irresistible impulse test or until replaced by the MPC
rule. See infra note 11. But M'Naghten is enjoying rediscovered status of late. The
United States Congress, which had declined to adopt any insanity rule for the federal
courts until 1984, finally adopted an updated version of the MizNaghten rule:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that, at the
time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a re-
sult of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and
quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise
constitute a defense.
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 17 (1988)). The M'Naghten rule can be seen as the culmination of earlier,
cruder tests that acknowledged the effects of cognitive defects on criminal behavior.
Earlier constructions made references to "idiots," "lunatics," one who "wholly loseth
his memory and understanding," one with a lesser understanding than "ordinarily a
child of fourteen hath," or one "totally deprived of his understanding and memory so as
not to know what he is doing, no more than an infant, brute or a wild beast." See ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 331 (citations omitted).
11 The MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (1985), insanity defense test reads as follows:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreci-
ate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
(2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social misconduct.
This formulation, while not quite as predominant as it was in the early 1980's, is still the
prevailing insanity rule in the United States. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 333.
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sufficient capacity to exercise freedom of choice. If an individual
lacked free choice, then it is unfair to punish that individual for fail-
ing to exercise free choice properly. The cognitive element of the
criminal insanity test, on the other hand, relates only indirectly to
free choice. It reflects the position that persons not capable of dis-
tinguishing between "right and wrong," as commonly understood
by normally functioning adults, cannot be understood to have "cho-
sen" a wrong act in preference to a right act, and therefore should
not be held criminally responsible for their "choice." Specifically,
the cognitive element of the insanity defense examines whether the
accused's volitional act was informed by an impaired mental process
that prevented the accused from appreciating the impropriety of his
actions. The rationale was summarized succinctly long ago by the
English jurist, Sir Matthew Hale:
The consent of the will is that, which renders human actions either
commendable or culpable .... And because the liberty or choice of
the will presupposeth an act of understanding to know the thing or
action chosen by the will, it follows that where there is a total defect of
the understanding, there is no free act of the will.
12
Although the volitional and cognitive elements of the insanity
defense comprise the standard pillars of the insanity rule, their mer-
its have been periodically debated and challenged. The history of
the insanity defense in Anglo-American law has been marked by re-
vision and re-revision. Instead of breaking new ground, however,
the revisions typically retreated or advanced by excluding or includ-
ing one of the two standard elements. 13
Whatever the constituent elements of the test have been, the
insanity defense has traditionally operated as an all-or-nothing
proposition: if insane at the time of the offense, the defendant is not
responsible for the conduct.' 4 For at least 300 years, respected
scholars and practitioners have argued that the all-or-nothing ap-
proach to excusing criminal responsibility is ignorant and unfair in
light of modern psychiatric understanding. In the United States, Dr.
12 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14-15 (1736).
13 Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988)), provides an example of such a retreat with respect to the
insanity defense. Between 1961 and 1981 the federal courts adopted the MPC rule,
which included both cognitive and volitional elements as alternative means to establish a
defense of insanity. English, supra note 9, at 2-3; supra note 11. By adopting the 1984
Act, Congress retreated from the later and more inclusive MPC rule and returned to a
version of the traditional M'Naghten rule. See supra note 10. Congress has been criticized
for doing so. See, e.g., English, supra note 9.
14 Sir Matthew Hale proposed the concept of partial insanity at the end of the seven-




Isaac Ray was an early advocate of adopting a legal view recognizing
degrees of diminished responsibility instead of an all-or-nothing po-
sition.' 5 Several prominent scholars of law and psychiatry have ad-
vanced similar arguments since Ray's time.' 6 Norval Morris' book
best articulates the abolitionists' position by proposing the abolition
of the special insanity defense as it has been known for centuries.'
7
Morris' objection to the insanity defense is based on the reality
that "choice is neither present nor absent ... [W]hat is at issue is
the degree of freedom of choice on a continuum from the hypotheti-
cally entirely rational to the hypothetically pathologically deter-
mined-in states of consciousness neither polar condition exists." 18
[T]he special defense of insanity... [is] a morally unsatisfactory
classification on the continuum between guilt and innocence. It ap-
plies in practice to only a few mentally ill criminals, thus omitting
many others with guilt-reducing relationships between their mental ill-
ness and their crime; it excludes other powerful pressures on human
behavior, thus giving excessive weight to the psychological over the
social. It is a false classification .... 19
Morris does not, however, advocate ignoring a defendant's mental
disorders. On the contrary, he proposes using mental disorder evi-
dence to disprove all or part of the actus reus and/or the mens rea,
and to inform the sentencing decision if the defendant is con-
victed.20 Thus, he advocates a more inclusive and graduated ap-
proach to the assessment of the relationship between mental
disorder and criminal responsibility, instead of the all-or-nothing re-
sult of the insanity defense.
Most legal scholars and lawmakers have resisted the idea of
such reforms precisely because the essential meaning of criminal re-
sponsibility is so clearly rooted in its insanity exception.2 1 The tra-
15 ISAAC RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 21 (1838).
16 Among the eminent abolitionists are Professor H.L.A. Hart, Professor Joel Fein-
berg, Lady Barbara Wooton, Dr. Seymour Halleck, and Dr. Thomas Szasz. In this Arti-
cle, I refer primarily to the work of Norval Morris as representative of this position.
17 See NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (1982).
18 Id. at 61.
19 Id. at 64.
20 Id. at 65.
21 In the past few years, three jurisdictions in the United States embraced the aboli-
tionist position. See IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (1993), MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102
(1985); § 46-14-201 (1985) (current version at § 46-14-214 (1992); § 46-14-203 (1985)
(current version at § 46-14-206 (1992); § 46-14-212 (1985) (current version at § 46-14-
205 (1992); and § 46-14-213 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1993). These
jurisdictions abolished the special defense as it had traditionally operated and allowed
evidence of mental abnormality to be introduced to rebut the mens rea of the offense
charged, as well as to influence the sentencing decision. Research in two of thesejuris-
dictions shows that the requirements of the new laws are not well understood or ob-
served. See Peter Heinbecker, Two Years' Experience Under Utah 's 1iens Rea Insanity Laws,
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ditionalists argue that to abolish the well-established special insanity
defense, as Norval Morris proposes, would threaten the very mean-
ing of criminal culpability. 22 Even to alter our perspective on the
proper legal consideration of the link between mental abnormality
and criminal responsibility would be to alter the very meaning of
criminal responsibility.
The positions of both the traditionalists and the abolitionists
beg equally for more information. As scientific inquiry slowly yields
greater understanding about the causal relationship between mental
disorder and volitional impairment, and between cognitive disorder
and volitional impairment, the insanity defense, or its substitute, will
surely be revised accordingly. The integrity of the meaning of crim-
inal culpability ultimately will depend on the extent to which centu-
ries-old notions of freedom of choice and moral cognition can
accommodate new scientific understanding. 23
The research findings presented in this Article are basic, and
provide an empirical context in which to consider the debate over
the proper legal view of the relationship between mental disorder
and criminal responsibility. Beyond that, however, the findings
have important implications for the meaning of criminal responsibil-
ity as they pertain to the traditionalist-abolitionist debate. These
implications are suggestive rather than definitive, but potentially
profound. After all, if a substantial proportion of criminal defend-
ants have a psychiatric impairment, then surely jurists must question
the fundamental meaning of criminal responsibility, at least as it is
operationalized.
B. SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE
The sociological interest in the coincidence of these two popu-
lations may be understood in the context of the study of social con-
trol. Criminaljustice and public psychiatry are two forms of formal,
governmental social control, which are premised on clearly distin-
14 BULL. AM. ACAD. L. & PSYCH. 185 (1986); HenryJ. Steadman et al., Maintenance of an
Insanity Defense Under Montana's "Abolition " of the Insanity Defense, 146 Am. J. PSYCH. 357
(1989).
22 See supra text accompanying note 6.
23 This notion is reflected in the words of the plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 536 (1967), where reference is made to:
• . . the centuries-long evolution of the collection of interlocking and overlapping
concepts which the common law has utilized to assess the moral accountability of an
individual for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity,
mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for a con-
stantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal




guishable criteria, but which sometimes operate in suspiciously simi-
lar fashion. 24 Both historical25 and empirical 26 research suggest that
control of the psychiatrically disordered and the criminal is, and has
been over the centuries, an interchangeable exercise to some extent.
In other words, some portion of the population controlled by the
mental health system is also controlled by the criminal justice sys-
tem, and vice-versa.
Interest in the subpopulation common to both systems of social
control has intensified in the past couple of decades. Relevant liter-
ature reflects a fairly widespread presumption that the subpopula-
tion of persons with mental disorders among the criminal defendant
population is substantial in size.27 This situation is commonly at-
tributed to three major factors: the deinstitutionalization movement
24 See DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976); ALLAN HORWITZ, THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1982).
25 MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE
AGE OF REASON (1965); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (1977).
26 See, e.g., Thomas M. Arvanites, The Impact of State Mental Hospital Deinstitutionalization
on Commitments for Incompetency to Stand Trial, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 307 (1988); Robert D.
Borgman, Diversion of Law Violators to Mental Health Facilities, 56 Soc. CASEWORK 418
(1975); Walter Dickey, Incompetency and the Vondangerous Mentally Ill Client, 16 CRIM. L.
BULL. 22 (1980-8 1); Ellen Hochstedler, Criminal Prosecution of the Mentally Disordered, 20 L.
& Soc. REV. 279 (1986) [hereinafter Criminal Prosecution]; Ellen Hochstedler, Twice-
Cursed? The Mentally Disordered Defendant, 14 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 251 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Twice Cursed?]; Ellen Hochstedler Steury, Specifying "Criminalization "of the Mentally Dis-
ordered Misdemeanant, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 334 (1991); TRANSCARCERATION:
ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONTROL (John Lowman et al. eds, 1987); RobertJ.
Menzies & Christopher D. Webster, W1'here They Go and What They Do: The Careers of Foren-
sic Patients in the Medicolegal Complex, 29 CAN.J. CRIMINOLOGY 275 (1987); RobertJ. Men-
zies, Psychiatrists in Blue: Police Apprehension of Mental Disorder and Dangerousness, 25
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1987); John Monahan et al., Police and the Mentally Ill: A Comparison of
Committed and Arrested Persons, 2 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY 509 (1979); L.S. Penrose, Mental
Disease and Crime: Outline of a Comparative Study of European Statistics, 28 BRIT. J. MED.
PSYCHOL. 1 (1939); Henry J. Steadman et al., Explaining the Increased Arrest Rate Among
Mental Patients: The Changing Clientele of State Hospitals, 135 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 816 (1978);
HenryJ. Steadman & Stephen A. Ribner, Changing Perceptions of the Mental Health Needs of
Inmates in Local Jails, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1115 (1980); Henry A. Steadman et al.,
Comparing Arrest Rates of Mental Patients and Criminal Offenders, 135 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 1218
(1978); Linda A. Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest Rate of the
Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 794 (1984); Linda A. Teplin, Detecting Disorder: The Treat-
ment of Mental Illness Among Jail Detainees, 58 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 233
(1990) [hereinafter Detecting Disorder]; Linda A. Teplin, The Prevalence of Severe Mental Dis-
order Among Male Urban Jail Detainees: Comparison with the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Pro-
gram, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 663 (1990) [hereinafter Prevalence].
27 See, e.g., RonJemelka et al., The Mentally Ill in Prisons: A Review, 40 Hosp. & COMM.
PSYCHIATRY 481 (1989); Edmund Kal, Mental Health in Jail, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 463
(1977); Carole Morgan, Developing Mental Health Systems for Local Jails, 8 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 259 (1981); Mark A. Schuckit et al., The Importance of Psychiatric Illness in Newly
Arrested Prisoners, 165 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 118 (1977).
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that began in the 1950s and continued through the 1960s, the fail-
ure to establish an extensive network of community mental health
programs to replace the institutional programs, and the increased
stringency of standards for involuntary civil commitment that swept
the nation from the late 1960s through the mid-1970s. 28 Despite
the interest in this subpopulation, basic questions about its charac-
teristics remain unanswered-inquiries which this Article addresses.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The findings presented in this Article address questions funda-
mentally important to both the jurisprudential and sociological lines
of inquiry. This study explores three important features of the sub-
population that is subjected to control by the criminal justice and
public mental health systems.
1. The prevalence question: What proportion of the criminal defendant pop-
ulation are also public psychiatric patients?
2. The probability question: Is the size of the psychiatrically impaired crimi-
nal defendant population larger than expected?
3. The rate question: Does the psychiatrically impaired criminal defendant
population account for a disproportionately large share of criminal cases?
The prevalence question lays the foundation for the latter two
questions, and establishes the parameters of the matter. The
probability question relates directly to the jurisprudential concern
about the very meaning of criminal culpability. If the empirical evi-
dence shows that the mentally impaired are not more likely to be
accused of a crime, then the independence of the meaning of crimi-
nal culpability from the meaning of mental disorder is implied. If,
on the other hand, the empirical evidence suggests a link between
criminal defendants and psychiatric patients, then independence of
the operationalized concepts is not implied, and the association re-
quires further examination from both a jurisprudential and a socio-
logical perspective. From the jurisprudential perspective, such an
association would question the integrity of the meaning of criminal
responsibility. From the sociological perspective, such a finding
would demand further inquiry to determine whether the coinci-
dence is due to the behavior of the individuals or to discretionary
selection by governmental agents. The importance of the rates
question is identical to the importance of the probability question; it
simply represents an amplification of the probability question. In
other words, if there is a statistically significant coincidence of status
as defendant and status as psychiatric patient, then do defendant-
28 RAELJEAN ISSAC & VIRGINIA ARMANT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL (1990).
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patients incur criminal charges at a greater rate than other defend-
ants? In terms of social control, both the rates question and the
prevalence question are potentially important with respect to defin-
ing the business of the criminal justice system.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In recent years, a fair amount of social scientific inquiry has fo-
cused on questions relating to, or questions presuming, the overlap
in the populations of the mental health and criminal justice systems.
These studies tend to be of two distinct varieties. One type analyzes
the decisions of a police officer when encountering persons who
may qualify as subjects of either the criminal justice or mental health
system.29 Each study in this category implicitly acknowledges the
existence of the intersection of these two populations. Only one of
them, however, was designed to provide an estimate of the size of
the two populations' intersection. Teplin's observational study of
field encounters between police and citizens produced an estimate
that 9.5% (N=14) of those arrested (N= 147) exhibited signs of
mental disturbance at the time of arrest.30 The major shortcoming
of Teplin's study is the small number of mentally disordered per-
sons observed.
The other type of study may be classified as "criminalization"
or "deinstitutionalization" literature. In large part, these studies
were ultimately aimed at assessing whether the proportion of psy-
chiatrically impaired criminals had increased as a result of the dein-
stitutionalization movement or as a result of the legal restrictions
placed on civil commitment, or both, as the "criminalization" hy-
pothesis claims.3' Most of these studies used large samples or
populations, but almost without exception based the sampling
29 See, e.g., Egon Bittner, Police Discretion in Emergency Apprehension of Mentally Ill Persons,
14 Soc. PROBS. 278 (1967); Jennifer C. Bonovitz &Jay S. Bonovitz, Diversion of the Men-
tally Ill into the CriminalJustice System: The Police Intervention Perspective, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 973 (1981); Jacobson et al., A Study of Police Referral of Allegedly Mentally-Ill Persons to a
Psychiatric Unit, in THE URBAN POLICEMAN IN TRANSITION: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIO-
LOGICAL REVIEW (J. Snibbe &J. Snibbe eds., 1973); Arthur R. Matthews, Observations on
Police Poliy and Procedures for Emergenty Detention of the Mentally Ill, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE SC. 283 (1970); Menzies, supra note 26; Monahan et al., supra note 26;
Linda A. Teplin, Managing Disorder: Police Handling of the Mentally Ill, in MENTAL HEALTH
& CRIMINAL JUSTICE 157 (Linda A. Teplin ed., 1984).
30 Teplin, supra note 29, at 163.
31 Testing the criminalization hypothesis is as difficult as testing the general deter-
rence hypothesis. Critical to the test is the measurement of something that did not hap-
pen. This inherently tricky measurement is, in this case, confounded by dramatic
changes in psychiatric understanding and treatment during the same period of time per-
tinent to the criminalization hypothesis.
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frames on populations specially selected for captivity, such as prison
or jail populations or releasees, 32 psychiatric hospital patients or
former patients, 33 incarcerated persons seeking psychiatric serv-
ices,3 4 or defendants hospitalized for treatment after being ruled in-
competent to stand trial.35 Incarcerated populations are already
winnowed by important selection decisions in the criminal justice
and mental health systems, and therefore reflect several levels of of-
ficial selection factors which confound the issue of the overlap be-
tween the criminal and psychiatric populations. Other studies have
avoided captive criminal populations, but examined criminal popu-
lations carefully selected on the basis of special psychiatric needs.
36
None of these studies were capable of providing an estimate of the
prevalence of the mentally disordered in the general (i.e., not se-
lected for captivity) criminal defendant population.
Based on a sample of charged, but not necessarily confined, de-
fendants, Hochstedler Steury reported that eighteen percent of the
misdemeanor defendants in her sample had a history of mental dis-
order.37 That study, however, employed indicators of mental disor-
der that did not permit the estimation of time-specific probabilities
or rates.38 Furthermore, the findings reported did not include fel-
ony defendants. Thus, Hochstedler Steury's results leave open the
basic question of the proportion of criminal defendants who are also
public psychiatric patients.
Any empirical study of crime and psychiatric disorder will suffer
from the inherent problems of measuring a nominal concept that is
a socio-political construct. Both crime and psychiatric disorder are
socio-political constructs that depend on official definition and are
applied to individuals in a real-world, socio-political context. It is
well recognized that the set of those who engage in criminal behav-
32 E.g., HenryJ. Steadman et al., The Impact of State Mental Hospital Deinstitutionalization
on United States Prison Populations, 1968-78, 75 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 474 (1984);
Steadman, supra note 26.
33 E.g., Joseph J. Cocozza et al., Trends in Violent Crime Among Ex-Mental Patients, 16
CRIMINOLOGY 317 (1978); Steadman, supra note 26.
34 E.g., Jennifer C. Bonovitz & Edward B. Guy, Impact of Restrictive Civil Commitment
Procedures on a Prison Psychiatric Service, 136 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1045 (1979).
35 E.g., Arvanites, supra note 26; Dickey, supra note 26.
36 E.g., Hochstedler, Criminal Prosecution, supra note 26; Hochstedler, Twice-Cursed?,
supra note 26; S. McMain et al., The Post-Assessment Careers of Mentally Disordered Offenders,
12 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY 189 (1989); Menzies, supra note 26; Menzies & Webster,
supra note 26.
37 Hochstedler Steury, supra note 26.
38 Id. at 343. The indicator of mental disorder in that study was very inclusive. It
included all those who had a record of contact with the public psychiatric facility at some
time in their lifetime, and also those who were screened and not admitted to either an
inpatient or outpatient program.
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ior and the set of those who are officially treated as criminals is not
an exact match.39 Similarly, there is no exact match between the set
of those who exhibit symptoms of psychiatric disorder and those
who "officially" have a psychiatric disorder.40 The problems of defi-
nition, observation, official recognition, and official selection are in-
herent in any measure of the applied forms of the criminal
responsibility and psychiatric disorder constructs.
Notwithstanding these inherent shortcomings, this study im-
proves the assessment of the intersection of the two subject popula-
tions, by using a very large sample that is not defined by
incarceration status. In this study, the criminal population consists
of all those charged with an offense during a five-year study period. The
psychiatric population consists of all those admitted for inpatient or out-
patient treatment during the same five-year study period. In other words,
this study is a cohort study of all those who had significant contact
(i.e., charged as a defendant or treated as a patient) with both the
criminal justice system and the mental health system in a five-year
period. In the terms popularized by Monahan and Steadman,4 1 this
study estimates the coincidence of "treated mental disorder" and
"treated crime," and offers a more inclusive assessment of that rela-
tionship than have other studies in the United States to date.
III. RESEARCH METHODS
A. STUDY SITE
Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, was the site of the study. Dur-
ing the period under study, 1981-85, Milwaukee County had a pop-
ulation of approximately one million residents, distributed
throughout one major city (with about 600,000 residents) and sev-
eral suburban municipalities. The adult (18 years old and older)
population in the jurisdiction averaged 704,000 during the five-year
study period. 42
The Milwaukee metropolitan area may be fairly described as
more socially conservative than much of the'urban United States; its
residents have a reputation for orderliness and conformity. At the
time of the study period, the area enjoyed a relatively low crime rate
compared to other urban areas. Drug-related crime, and its highly
39 John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Crime and Mental Disorder" An Epidemiological
Approach, in 4 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 145 (Michael Tonry
& Norval Morris eds., 1983).
40 Id. at 177.
41 Id. at 153.
42 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 1988, 588 (1988).
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publicized attendant problems, came to Milwaukee later than in
many other parts of the country, and thus was not a salient crime
factor at the time of this study.
The Milwaukee metropolitan area is noticeably segregated
along ethnic and racial lines. During the study period, Milwaukee's
African-American population composed less than twenty percent of
the population, 43 was clearly segregated with respect to housing,
and occupied a distinctly disadvantaged socio-economic position.
Moreover, both African-Americans and the poor were proportion-
ately over-represented in Milwaukee's criminal population: more
than half of the defendants in the study were African-American
(sixty percent of the felons and fifty-two percent of the misdemean-
ants), and a large majority of the defendants in the study were indi-
gent for the purpose of providing defense counsel (eighty-two
percent of the felons and fifty-eight percent of the misdemeanants).
Although Wisconsin is socially conservative, it is not necessarily
politically conservative, as indicated by its long tradition of progres-
sive government and social services. It has sometimes been charac-
terized as a "social work state," due in large part to its publicly-
funded mental health facilities which have been highly ranked in the
industry.44 Milwaukee's 830-bed public inpatient psychiatric facility,
opened in 1979, is Wisconsin's largest mental health care facility.
The intake unit for this facility is one of the busiest psychiatric emer-
gency reception centers in the nation.
45
Historically, Wisconsin has aggressively protected the rights of
its accused, liberally providing constitutional rights to alleged crimi-
nal defendants. For instance, Milwaukee's criminal defense bar has
been generally viewed as zealous and competent and its legal aid
lawyers have bequeathed a legacy of cases protecting the mentally ill
from undue state intervention. Furthermore, Wisconsin adjudi-
cated Lessard v. Schmidt, 46 the "primer" on due process rights for
civil commitment respondents, as well as subsequent cases requiring
periodic reviews of orders to confine the mentally ill and others who
have been protectively placed.47 Though the state legislature peri-
43 Id.
44 Wisconsin's mental health facilities have been favorably rated as "improving sig-
nificantly" in recent years. E. FULLER TORRY ET AL., CARE OF THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY
ILL: A RATING OF THE STATE PROGRAMS (3d ed. 1990).
45 Telephone interview with Jon E. Gudeman, M.D., Chief Administrator and Medi-
cal Director, Milwaukee County Mental Health Complex (1992).
46 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), 379
F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), 413 F. Supp.
1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
47 State ex rel Watts v. Combined Community Services Bd., 362 N.W.2d 104 (1985).
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odically debates whether to relax the civil commitment laws, it has
not substantively altered those laws since adopting Lessard's criteria
in the Mental Health Act of 1976.48
The local prosecutor's office has enjoyed a reputation of stabil-
ity, efficiency, and even-handedness. It exhibits a legalistic4 9 ap-
proach to applying the law, and is led by a career prosecutor who
has been re-elected every two years since first taking office in 1968.
It is a progressive office in many respects, 50 and, like most govern-
ment offices in Wisconsin, has avoided any major scandal or hint of
corruption in recent memory.
In short, during the study period, Milwaukee County was a so-
cially conservative and racially segregated community, with a resi-
dent population that prized orderliness. It had some of the most
stringent civil commitment laws in the country, and one of the best-
equipped and staffed public psychiatric facilities. Milwaukee's jus-
tice system consisted of respected defense lawyers representing ac-
cused criminals and respondents to civil commitment petitions, and
even-handed prosecutors operating in a legalistic, yet progressive,
manner. This, then, was the climate for public psychiatry and crimi-
nal justice in the study jurisdiction.
B. SAMPLE AND DATA
Two independent random samples, one felony and one misde-
meanor, were drawn from criminal cases filed between January 1,
1981 and December 31, 1985. 51 The felony sample consisted of
48 State Alcohol, Drug Abuse, Developmental Disabilities, and Mental Health Act,
Wis. STAT. § 51.20 (1976).
49 See JOHN Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW
AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES (1968). Wilson observed police behavior in eight
departments and classified the styles of behavior as: watchman, legalistic, and service-
oriented. These styles may be easily viewed as styles of dispensing justice which extend
beyond the police department. The legalistic style is characterized by greater adherence
to the letter of the law. Id. at 172. "Who you are, -who you know, and what kind of
neighborhood you live in" would make the least difference in the legalistic bureaucracy;
what you did would make the most difference in this working environment. Id. at 188.
50 Examples of the progressiveness of the prosecutor's office abound. For example,
it received one of the first computerized information systems (PROMIS) from federal
funds; it has received numerous grants for demonstration projects to improve case
processing and delinquent youth programs; it established a mental health screening unit
in 1981, and a diversion program for bad-check writers. It has been, and is one of a
handful of very aggressive local prosecutor's offices with respect to white-collar and cor-
porate crime, an egalitarian crusade that garnered national attention in the 1980's. See
Ira Reiner & Jan Chatten-Brown, 'hen it is not an Accident, but a Crime: Prosecutors Get
Tough with OSHA Violations, 17 N. Ky. L. REV. 83 (1989).
51 It was necessary to draw independent samples of felony and misdemeanor cases
because of the filing system of the Clerk of Courts.
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5000 cases, with charges filed against 5431 defendants. Some de-
fendants, of course, had more than one felony case charged against
them in the five-year time period; there were 4921 unique defendants
in the felony sample.
Selection of the 20,000 cases that originally composed the mis-
demeanor sample was made with the knowledge that certain cases
would be purposefully excluded from this analysis. The intention
was to examine "street crime" misdemeanors, or at least those of-
fenses widely viewed as mala in se, or the lesser forms of felony of-
fenses. To that end, the following kinds of cases were excluded
from the study: (1) all misdemeanor criminal traffic offenses; (2) all
Department of Natural Resources crimes;52 (3) all Department of
Transportation offenses; 53 (4) child support transgressions; and (5)
a group of "other" offenses that include rather esoteric regulations
such as selling goods without a permit, or operating a salvage busi-
ness without a permit. Simple possession of marijuana offenses
were also excluded from the study. 54 After excluding the above
mentioned cases, the remaining misdemeanor sample consisted of
5928 named misdemeanor defendants, 5411 of which were unique
misdemeanor defendants.
The 4921 unique felony defendants and 5411 unique misde-
meanor defendants constitute the two independent, 55 random sam-
ples used in this analysis as the basis for estimates pertaining to the
population of formally accused criminals. The names and birth
dates of the defendants in the two random samples were manually
checked against the admission records of the local public psychiatric
facility, the Milwaukee County Mental Health Complex. The patient
identification number was collected from the hospital admission
records and, in turn, this anonymous identifier was used to access
52 The Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") oversees the use of lakes, state
parks, state forests, and other protected land areas in the state. The DNR enforces
mostly regulatory offenses, including, inter alia, hunting and fishing licenses, boat regis-
tration, fish-hook usage, oar lock and life preserver usage in boats, swimming, and scuba
diving areas.
53 Department of Transportation regulations include such things as truck weight,
road tax assessments, and required equipment for commercial vehicles.
54 Milwaukee hosts large festivals nearly every weekend of the summer that attract a
lot of tourists, and are the occasion for a great deal of petty recreational drug use among
young tourists and residents. During the study period, the vast majority of misde-
meanor drug offense charges were associated with these festivals. Such activity did not
meet the "street crime" criterion established for inclusion in the study, and therefore
misdemeanor marijuana offenses were excluded from the study. Note that among drug
offenses, only misdemeanor offenses for simple possession of marijuana were excluded;
all other drug offenses were retained for inclusion in the study.
55 Some of the "unique" misdemeanor defendants were also "unique" felony de-
fendants. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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computerized admission and discharge data for all study subjects




During the five-year study period, less than 10% of the accused
defendants were also treated as psychiatric patients (see Table 1).
5 7
Specifically, only 8.6% of the felony defendants, 9.1% of the misde-
meanor defendants, and 9.7% of the defendants drawn in both sam-
ples were treated at the public psychiatric facility in the five-year
study period. Although the figures signify that a small percentage of
the defendant population, regardless of the seriousness of the of-
fense, were treated for psychiatric problems at some point during
the five-year study period, that percentage is not negligible.
The findings are remarkably similar to Teplin's finding that
9.5% of those arrested exhibited signs of mental disorder at the
time of arrest, despite the fact that Teplin's measures of criminal
involvement and mental disorder differed from the ones used in this
study.58 Teplin's study measured criminal involvement by arrest
while this study measured criminal involvement by charges issued.
Also, Teplin measured mental disorder on the basis of trained grad-
uate students' observations of the subject during the police-citizen
encounter, 59 whereas this study measured mental disorder on the
basis of admission to a bed or a program at the public psychiatric
facility sometime within the five-year study period.
B. PROBABILITIES
Although a fairly small proportion of defendants were also psy-
chiatric patients, the defendant-patients were nevertheless over-rep-
resented in the defendant population. Table 2 provides figures to
support this conclusion. Using sample Ns as a guide, the number of
unique defendants in the five-year study period was estimated
56 The human subjects protection review boards at both the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee and at the Medical College of Wisconsin reviewed and approved the human
subject research protocol for this study. The medical college of Wisconsin's Research
Committee is the human subjects oversight board for the Milwaukee County Mental
Health Complex.
57 Even when the two independent samples were combined and "unduplicated" for
defendants appearing in both the felony and misdemeanor samples, the proportion of
mentally disordered was less than 10% (8.9%).
58 Teplin, supra note 29, at 162.
59 Id. at 160-62.
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(N=38878). The number of unique adult patients admitted to
either inpatient or outpatient programs during the study period
(N= 16144) was determined from the computerized admission
records of the mental health facility. The average adult county pop-
ulation during the five year study period was 704,000.60 During the
study period, about 55 out of 1000 adult residents were charged
with a crime, and about 23 out of 1000 adult residents received
treatment at the public psychiatric facility in the same period.
If two phenomena are unrelated, the probability of both occur-
ring jointly is the product of the two independent probabilities.
Thus, the probability of a subject being both a defendant and a psy-
chiatric patient during the study period, if the two phenomena were
independent, was less than 13 in 10,000 resident adults, or about
890 persons for the county area.6' In contrast, the estimated
number of actual defendant-patients was 3489 in the five-year pe-
riod, or a probability of nearly 50 in 10,000 (.00495). Given these
estimates, the coincidence of psychiatric treatment and criminal ac-
cusation occurred nearly four times as often as would be expected if
the two phenomena were independent. Stated in another way, ap-
proximately 23 of every 1000 adult residents received treatment at
the public psychiatric facility during the study period, whereas 89
out of every 1000 defendants received treatment at the public psy-
chiatric facility during the study period. Again, the conclusion is
that psychiatric impairment was over-represented among defend-
ants by almost four times compared to the general population.
Based on these findings, the two phenomena do not appear to
be independent. The findings from this study parallel the only
other published finding of this nature based on data from the
United States. Teplin reported that the incidence of severe mental
disorder among urban male jail inmates was between two and three
times the rate of those disorders detected in the population in the
catchment area.62
C. RATES
On the whole, the psychiatrically impaired defendants ac-
counted for more than their share of the cases filed. Table 3 shows
the number of cases per defendant. Defendant-patients, with the
60 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 42, at 588.
61 The probability of being a criminal defendant (.055) multiplied by the probability
of being a public psychiatric patient (.023) is equal to .001265, or less than 13 in 10,000.
See HERMAN J. LOETHER & DONALD J. McTAVISH, INFERENTIAL STATISTICS FOR SOCIOLO-
GISTS: AN INTRODUCTION 27 (1974).
62 Teplin, Prevalence, supra note 26, at 663.
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exception of those drawn only in the felony sample, accumulated
more criminal accusations in the five-year study period than did
other defendants.
The similarity in the rates of felony defendants and defendant-
patients may be explained by an opportunity factor. It is reasonable
to expect that felons would not have the same opportunity to com-
mit additional offenses, given their longer incarceration periods.
This lack of opportunity is the probable explanation of the lower
rate for felons, regardless of mental disorder. This explanation is
also consistent with the differential between the mentally disordered
and others who are charged with lesser offenses. A plausible sum-
mary interpretation of these findings is that, given ample opportu-
nity to commit crimes, those with mental disorders are more often
charged with criminal offenses.
V. DISCUSSION
There exists a small subset of persons who are members of both
the criminal justice system and the public mental health system.
Specifically, slightly less than ten percent of the defendants in a five-
year period had been public psychiatric patients in the same five-
year period. This figure is far less than many have predicted. 63
The two findings-that there are more individuals with both
mental disorder and criminal charges than would be predicted if the
two phenomena were independent of each other, and that defend-
ants with mental disorders have higher rates of incurring criminal
charges than do other defendants-raise an always-troubling ques-
tion: are these statistical associations due to the behavior of the of-
fenders or to the choices of the decision-makers in the criminal
justice system? It is possible that those with mental disorder are
more likely to be involved in activities that typically lead to arrest
and prosecution. Alternatively, the findings on the probability ques-
tion and the rate questions may be a result of discretionary decisions
by police and prosecutors. Indeed, these two different explanations
have special, although not incongruent, importance to both juris-
prudential and sociological thinking.
A. JURISPRUDENTIAL ISSUES
These findings address the critical question of the meaning of
criminal responsibility. 64 On the one hand, the fact that the mental
63 See supra note 27.
64 Of course, some number of persons charged are not convicted because of their
mental capacity. A subsample (1680 felons and 2220 misdemeanants) of those who
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health system regulated less than ten percent of the defendant pop-
ulation in a five-year period suggests that criminal responsibility is
not a pseudonym for psychiatric impairment to any significant de-
gree. On the other hand, if being criminally responsible is predi-
cated on particular cognitive and/or volitional capacities, then the
finding regarding the size of the defendant-patient subpopulation
still begs for explanation. It is clear that very few persons and very
few defendants have psychiatric impairments that satisfy the crimi-
nal insanity test. It is also clear that cognitive and volitional psychi-
atric impairments exist on a continuum. These data seem to show
that those with psychiatric impairment of some kind and some de-
gree are found in disproportionately large numbers among those
charged with crime. Even if their representation is due to conduct
rather than to differential responses by law enforcement personnel
(discussed below), this finding has important implications for the
definition of criminal responsibility. To what extent are the notions
of criminal culpability and the concomitant condemnation of the
community65 inconsistent with modem understandings of personal
responsibility in light of psychiatric incapacities? The obvious juris-
prudential question that must be addressed ultimately is the extent
to which psychiatric impairment diminishes moral cognition and
free will, and the extent to which those diminished states are disso-
nant with the premise of criminal culpability.
Future research must examine, on an individual-level, the tem-
poral proximity and sequential order of the mental health problem
to the criminal conduct, 66 the nature of the psychiatric disorder in
light of the nature of the crime, and the nature and severity of the
psychiatric disorder in terms of improperly developed, diminished
or impaired free will. A re-examination of the concept of free will in
light of modern psychiatric and psychological understanding of cog-
nitive and volitional capacities may well lead to a reconsideration of
the traditional exceptions to criminal responsibility. 67
were charged was drawn, and data pertinent to the case disposition was collected. Only
14 felons and one misdemeanant were found not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI"),
hardly enough to make a statistical difference in a sample of this size. In addition, one-
third of those found NGRI were not treated at the public psychiatric facility in the five-
year study period. A different perspective showed no difference between defendants
and defendant-patients with respect to case disposition: the conviction rate for the fel-
ony defendant-patients is identical to that for other felony defendants (80%); similarly,
the conviction rate for misdemeanor defendant-patients is identical to that for other
misdemeanor defendants (49%).
65 Hart, supra note 5, at 404.
66 Judith Godwin Rabkin, Criminal Behavior of Discharged Mental Patients: A Critical Ap-
praisal of the Research, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 17 (1979).




These findings, once again, point to the importance of distin-
guishing between qualification and selection in the operation of so-
cial control. In other words, is there a statistical association
between the mentally disordered and the criminally accused because
mentally disordered persons are particularly well qualified (i.e., they
exhibit more criminal conduct), or because they are particularly sin-
gled out for selection?
1. Selection Studies
A handful of prior studies have focused on the exercise of po-
lice discretion in selecting mentally disordered persons for arrest,
but none have resolved the qualification-versus-selection contro-
versy. Prior to the study conducted by Teplin,68 all observational
studies of the exercise of police discretion with respect to arresting
mentally disordered persons were flawed by the use of small or non-
random samples, or both.69
Teplin's study was designed to correct the flaws in earlier stud-
ies.70 Her primary conclusion was that police select informal dispo-
sitions more often than not, irrespective of the person's state of
mental health. 7' She also notes, however, that the incidents for
ceptions, and a new way of understanding the relationship between criminal responsibil-
ity and cognitive and volitional impairment and development. It is obvious how the
special exception for insanity is inextricably linked to the special exception for infancy
(immaturity) and the special provisions for incompetency to stand trial.
Illness is an exception to criminal responsibility that is so deeply ingrained in our
thinking that it is difficult for us to even recognize it. The presumption that illness is a
matter which is out of bounds for the criminal law is evident from case law.
No man shall be held accountable, criminally, for an act which was the offspring and
product of a mental disease .... No argument is needed to show that to hold that a
man may be punished for what is the offspring of a disease would be to hold that he
may be punished for disease. Any rule which makes that possible cannot be law.
State v.Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 394 (1871). Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a common cold. Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
Samuel Butler's Erewhon, written in the mid-1800's, challenges the presumption that
illness is not a proper subject of punishment. In the fictional land of Erewhon, wrong-
doing is treated with sympathetic "correction," but disease is punished, sometimes with
the death penalty. This system ofjustice might be criticized for giving excessive weight
to the physical over the social and psychological. Morris, supra note 17, at 64. The
points to be pondered are these: as medical science and understanding advance, what
will become of the distinction between illness and insanity, and in turn, what will be-
come of the meaning of criminal culpability, which is now partially defined by insanity?
68 Teplin, supra note 29.
69 Bittner, supra note 29; Bonovitz, supra note 29; Jacobson et al., supra note 29; Mat-
thews, supra note 29; Menzies, supra note 26; Monahan et al., supra note 26.
70 Teplin, supra note 29.
71 Id. at 173.
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which the mentally disordered were arrested did not result in arrest
when committed by apparently non-disordered persons.
Arrest was not a pafticularly frequent disposition; only 16.5% of the
eighty-five mentally disordered persons were arrested. Nevertheless,
the arrest rate for suspects exhibiting signs of serious mental disorder
was significantly greater than that for non-mentally ill suspects for sim-
ilar types of incidents .... Apparently, there are a number of charac-
teristics common to situations involving mentally disordered persons
that appear to increase the probability of arrest.
72
Confidence in Teplin's conclusion is threatened by the very small
number of subjects (N= 14). Furthermore, her study was restricted
to police discretion; the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not
part of the Teplin study. Thus, it is unknown whether the arrestees
were charged and convicted, i.e., whether they were treated as
criminals by subsequent decision-makers.
Robertson 73 used a different perspective to explore the possi-
bility of selection bias in arrests of mentally disordered persons. He
presented evidence of a selection bias in effect, but did not attribute
the disparity to decision-making on the part of law-enforcement offi-
cials. Rather, Robertson's assertion, as borne out by his findings, is
that non-disordered persons are more likely to escape detection and
are less likely to turn themselves in to the police than are persons
with mental disorder.74
Studies of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in issuing
charges against the mentally disordered are virtually nonexistent.
Hochstedler used samples of defendants who had already been
charged, thus reflecting the outcome of the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, but did not examine the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion itself.75 Using a sample of misdemeanor defendants, Hoch-
stedler Steury reported the combined effects of the exercise of
prosecutorial and judicial discretion, as reflected in judgment and
sentencing decisions. 76 She concluded that defendants with a his-
tory of mental disorder were sanctioned more severely than other
misdemeanants, "both in process and punishment. '77 With respect
to defendants charged with disorderly conduct, however, she inter-
preted the findings to suggest that there was "judicial correction,"
72 Id. at 165.
73 Graham Robertson, Arrest Patterns Among Mentally Disordered Offenders, 153 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 313 (1988).
74 Id.
75 Hochstedler, Criminal Prosecution, supra note 26; Hochstedler, Twice-Cursed?, supra
note 26.
76 Hochstedler Steury, supra note 26, at 337.
77 Id. at 359.
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primarily in the form of dismissal, for the presumed police and
prosecutorial over-selection of the mentally disordered.7s
2. Qualification Studies
Recent research findings lend support to the qualification hy-
pothesis. 79 One study compared community residents-with and
without recent evidence of psychiatric disorder-on the basis of self-
reported violent acts.80 The researchers report a statistically signifi-
cant association between self-reported violent acts and mental dis-
order.8' Another community study compared self-reported and
official measures of violent and illegal behavior of psychiatric pa-
tients in the community with a sample of community residents who
had no history of psychiatric treatment.8 2 Findings from this study
also indicate that the psychiatric patients had higher rates of violent
conduct, as well as higher arrest rates. Furthermore, the arrest of
the former patients were more likely to be for serious offenses and
violent behavior than for trivial offenses.83 These studies have par-
ticular importance because they do not rely exclusively on official
measures of violent or criminal behavior, which inherently intro-
duce the possibility of selection bias. In light of these studies, there
is greater faith in the conclusions of other population studies that
do rely on official measures of crime.8
4
3. Future Research
While the research of recent years shows a marked improve-
ment over much of the previous work in this area, the qualification-
selection debate is not yet resolved, and future research must be
designed to explore these alternative explanations. The next logical
step in this line of inquiry is an examination of the behavioral
precipitants of the formal accusation, the behavior that led to the
charge. Such an investigation should be designed to determine
whether defendant-patients behave in a manner that is typical of, or
78 Id. at 357.
79 See John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47
AM. PSYCHOL. 511 (1992).
80 Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence
from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 761 (1990).
81 Id. at 765.
82 Bruce Link et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Reconsidered, 57
AM. Soc. REv. 257 (1992).
83 Id. at 289.
84 E.g., Per Lindqvist & Peter Allebeck, Schizophrenia and Crime: A Longitudinal Follow-
up of 644 Schizophrenics in Stockholm, 157 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 345 (1990); Pamela J. Taylor &




different from, other defendants. 85 Furthermore, future research
must determine whether defendant-patients are charged with of-
fenses that are similar to or different from the offenses charged
against other defendants who exhibit the same kind of behavior in
the same context. Such research would provide information critical
to the assessment of the qualification-versus-selection controversy.
Moreover, such information would directly address the suspicion
that the criminal justice system tends to differentially control the
mentally disordered when other means of social control are not
readily available, i.e., the so-called criminalization hypothesis.
VI. SUMMARY
An examination of the size of the intersection of two popula-
tions subjected to formal governmental social control-criminal de-
fendants and psychiatric patients-revealed that the intersection is
small: less than ten percent of the criminal defendants who were
charged with a felony, a misdemeanor, or both in the space of five
years received psychiatric treatment at the public mental health fa-
cility during the same five-year period. Despite the small size of the
defendant-patient subpopulation, it is nonetheless nearly four times
as large as it would be if the two phenomena were independent. In
other words, there is a significant association between mental disor-
der and defendant status as reflected by these data. Moreover, find-
ings from this study also indicate that defendants with mental
disorder have higher per capita rates of being charged with crime
than do other defendants.
85 Taylor recently reported the results of such an inquiry, but her sample was re-
stricted to prisoners. She reported that the nature and seriousness of the criminal vio-
lence differed markedly between psychotic and non-psychotic prisoners. See Pamela J.
Taylor, Schizophrenia and Crime: Distinctive Patterns in Association, in MENTAL DISORDER AND
CRIME (Sheilagh Hodgins ed., 1993). Ashford also conducted a study that reflected this
approach, but his population was the already-winnowed jail inmate population, and the
detail of his information on criminal activity and context was far more limited. See Jos6
B. Ashford, Offense Comparisons Between Ientally Disordered and Non-lentally Disordered In-
mates, 31 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 35 (1989).
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TABLE 2. NUMBER OF SAMPLED CASES AND DEFENDANTS, AND
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TABLE 3. RATES OF CHARGES (CHARGES PER DEFENDANT) OF























a Includes 511 felony and 517 misdemeanor cases.
b Includes 54 felony cases and 60 misdemeanor cases.
